Friday, June 16, 2006
SoftBank rebranding
"SoftBank" replaces "Vodafone" brand in Japan.
Photographs below show the world famous Vodafone board on Tokyo-Shibuya's Hachiko-square being replaced by the SoftBank advertisement from June 14, 2006.
Photographs below show the world famous Vodafone board on Tokyo-Shibuya's Hachiko-square being replaced by the SoftBank advertisement from June 14, 2006.
Monday, June 12, 2006
SoftBank starts rebranding Vodafone in Japan
Saturday June 10, 2006 was the first time we saw SoftBank replacing the Vodafone brand in Japan - bringing a formal end to Europe's largest ever investment in Japan.
Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan is a turning point in more ways than one and has wider implications for Europe (read below).
Vodafone's withdrawal also shows, that the values of cross-cultural management skills are often underestimated.
SoftBank's brand strategy
Upper image shows the world-famous Vodafone board on Shibuya's hachiko square, which has appeared in many movies and TV shows. It will soon be replaced.
Lower image shows one of the first SoftBank advertisements in Tokyo's busiest commuter railstation Shinjuku showing Sharp's mobile-TV handset.
The photo demonstrates SoftBank's brand strategy of partnering with world-famous brands, such as with Apple's iPod and Sharp's AQUOS display brand.
Implications for Europe of Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan
As a European myself, I am looking at the wider implications for Europe of Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan - and our company was recently awarded a contract by the European Union Government on exactly these issues - as well as others.
Vodafone's investment was by far the largest European investment in Japan. What is maybe less well known is that Vodafone was dispatching a relatively large stream of managers between several
continents (Europe, Australia etc) and Japan. Several times when visiting the KDDI Designing Center for example I could meet young German Vodafone managers who had just arrived for a management position at Vodafone-Japan, and who were studying the mobile phone handsets in KDDI's showroom. These expatriates all left within a few weeks of SoftBank taking control of the company.
As a result of these interactions, Vodafone could bring J-Phone's J-Sky mobile internet service to Europe, which was adapted for European conditions and rebranded "Vodafone Live!". There would be no "Vodafone Live!" in Europe without Vodafone's acquisition of J-Phone (including JSky). Vodafone also brought SHARP and Toshiba mobile handsets to Europe.
Apart from the immediate impact on Vodafone as a Corporation, we expect also a more general longterm impact from the strong reduction of Europe-Japan technology exchanges due to Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan.
Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan also shows how difficult it is for European telecom firms to succeed in Japan - and for Japanese firms in the telecom sector to succeed in Europe. Our company knows this first-hand from our work for NTT-Communications, and some other Japanese companies. - Read our presentation to Japanese industry associations here (in Japanese language).
It also shows how easy it is to underestimate the importance of cross-cultural management skills and the associated perils.
While large US corporations, including INTEL, General Motors, and Motorola have been forced by confrontation with Japan's competition to completely reshape themselves, this has not yet happened to any large European corporation because of the larger perceived separation between EU and Japan.
Comparing Europe and Japan in telecoms....
Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan is a turning point in more ways than one and has wider implications for Europe (read below).
Vodafone's withdrawal also shows, that the values of cross-cultural management skills are often underestimated.
SoftBank's brand strategy
Upper image shows the world-famous Vodafone board on Shibuya's hachiko square, which has appeared in many movies and TV shows. It will soon be replaced.
Lower image shows one of the first SoftBank advertisements in Tokyo's busiest commuter railstation Shinjuku showing Sharp's mobile-TV handset.
The photo demonstrates SoftBank's brand strategy of partnering with world-famous brands, such as with Apple's iPod and Sharp's AQUOS display brand.
Implications for Europe of Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan
As a European myself, I am looking at the wider implications for Europe of Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan - and our company was recently awarded a contract by the European Union Government on exactly these issues - as well as others.
Vodafone's investment was by far the largest European investment in Japan. What is maybe less well known is that Vodafone was dispatching a relatively large stream of managers between several
continents (Europe, Australia etc) and Japan. Several times when visiting the KDDI Designing Center for example I could meet young German Vodafone managers who had just arrived for a management position at Vodafone-Japan, and who were studying the mobile phone handsets in KDDI's showroom. These expatriates all left within a few weeks of SoftBank taking control of the company.
As a result of these interactions, Vodafone could bring J-Phone's J-Sky mobile internet service to Europe, which was adapted for European conditions and rebranded "Vodafone Live!". There would be no "Vodafone Live!" in Europe without Vodafone's acquisition of J-Phone (including JSky). Vodafone also brought SHARP and Toshiba mobile handsets to Europe.
Apart from the immediate impact on Vodafone as a Corporation, we expect also a more general longterm impact from the strong reduction of Europe-Japan technology exchanges due to Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan.
Vodafone's withdrawal from Japan also shows how difficult it is for European telecom firms to succeed in Japan - and for Japanese firms in the telecom sector to succeed in Europe. Our company knows this first-hand from our work for NTT-Communications, and some other Japanese companies. - Read our presentation to Japanese industry associations here (in Japanese language).
It also shows how easy it is to underestimate the importance of cross-cultural management skills and the associated perils.
While large US corporations, including INTEL, General Motors, and Motorola have been forced by confrontation with Japan's competition to completely reshape themselves, this has not yet happened to any large European corporation because of the larger perceived separation between EU and Japan.
Comparing Europe and Japan in telecoms....
Sunday, June 11, 2006
BlackBerry for Japan
DoCoMo plans to sell BlackBerry to corporates in Japan
With the RiM/NTP patent infringement lawsuit settled with a US$612.5 million payment, DoCoMo and Research in Motion (RiM) announced on June 8, 2006 that DoCoMo plans to start selling BlackBerry in Japan from autumn 2006 to corporate customers. Will RiM invest US$ 612.5 million to build business in Japan? Less? or more?
Over the last years I was asked 100s of times by foreign CEOs and expatriate managers why BlackBerry does not work and does not exist in Japan. Several large global corporations also asked us for work arounds to get solutions in place for Japan which fulfill the job of BlackBerry. Finally, also several venture companies came to us which supply secure corporate email solutions and corporate scheduling applications similar to BlackBerry's offerings.
Which BlackBerry device will DoCoMo offer
Although we have not seen an official announcement of the precise BlackBerry device DoCoMo will offer, we assume that it will be based on the Blackberry 8707 device.
We have also heard the following details:
Why was there no BlackBerry in Japan?
For a number of reasons:
What are BlackBerry's prospects in Japan? Will BlackBerry be successful in Japan?
The key issue will be whether RiM invests sufficiently to succeed in Japan. Foreign telecom firms - including some of the most famous - have a record of underinvesting in Japan, and as a consequence to fail, or to remain trapped with a 0.5% market share. Will BlackBerry remain focused on the niche foreign executive market, or will BlackBerry expand into the much bigger mainstream in Japan?
The success of Willcom's W-ZERO is an indicator that BlackBerry might be successful beyond the expatriate market.
What will make success difficult for BlackBerry in Japan?
Success is not at all guaranteed for BlackBerry in Japan. We see as key issues:
Read an article in Red Herring about BlackBerry's announced entry to Japan, partly based on an interview with our CEO.
With the RiM/NTP patent infringement lawsuit settled with a US$612.5 million payment, DoCoMo and Research in Motion (RiM) announced on June 8, 2006 that DoCoMo plans to start selling BlackBerry in Japan from autumn 2006 to corporate customers. Will RiM invest US$ 612.5 million to build business in Japan? Less? or more?
Over the last years I was asked 100s of times by foreign CEOs and expatriate managers why BlackBerry does not work and does not exist in Japan. Several large global corporations also asked us for work arounds to get solutions in place for Japan which fulfill the job of BlackBerry. Finally, also several venture companies came to us which supply secure corporate email solutions and corporate scheduling applications similar to BlackBerry's offerings.
Which BlackBerry device will DoCoMo offer
Although we have not seen an official announcement of the precise BlackBerry device DoCoMo will offer, we assume that it will be based on the Blackberry 8707 device.
We have also heard the following details:
- The planned BlackBerry for Japan will work on DoCoMo's FOMA (wCDMA) network in Japan, and will also have in-built connectivity for GSM and GPRS (2G legacy networks which are and will be in use for a long time to come in most countries outside Japan)
- The initial BlackBerry device will have no Japanese input, which restricts the device to foreign expatriates in Japan, and guarantees to keep BlackBerry initially out of the mainstream Japanese market. This means that the initial market will be mainly managers in foreign subsidiaries in Japan. Those managers who are integrated into Japan's business world and private world, will need a separate local Japanese mobile phone to communicate and exchange email messages with their Japanese colleagues
Why was there no BlackBerry in Japan?
For a number of reasons:
- RiM did not invest in Japan
- RiM reached no agreement with Japan's mobile operators
- BlackBerry until recently did not work with 3G (wCDMA/UMTS) which dominates in Japan
- Also, BlackBerry's QWERTY keyboard gives no advantage for Japanese language input
- and finally, Japanese mobile phones with added software already provide most functions of a BlackBerry (and a lot more functions which BlackBerries cannot do)
What are BlackBerry's prospects in Japan? Will BlackBerry be successful in Japan?
The key issue will be whether RiM invests sufficiently to succeed in Japan. Foreign telecom firms - including some of the most famous - have a record of underinvesting in Japan, and as a consequence to fail, or to remain trapped with a 0.5% market share. Will BlackBerry remain focused on the niche foreign executive market, or will BlackBerry expand into the much bigger mainstream in Japan?
The success of Willcom's W-ZERO is an indicator that BlackBerry might be successful beyond the expatriate market.
What will make success difficult for BlackBerry in Japan?
Success is not at all guaranteed for BlackBerry in Japan. We see as key issues:
- according to our information BlackBerry will not allow Japanese language input
- apparently BlackBerry will not support i-mode. Lack of i-Mode automatically cuts BlackBerry out of Japan's mainstream
- RiM will need to fulfill DoCoMo's quality requirements, which tend to be higher then those in other markets
- RiM's art will be to balance necessary investments and profitability requirements
Read an article in Red Herring about BlackBerry's announced entry to Japan, partly based on an interview with our CEO.
