Kazuo Inamori, founder of Kyocera and DDI (KDDI), rebuilds Japan Airlines using Amoeba Management (アメーバ経営)

Kazuo Inamori: founder of Kyocera, DDI (KDDI) & turnround of Japan Airlines

Kazuo Inamori (稲盛 和夫) one of Japan’s legendary serial entrepreneurs

Japan Airlines (日本航空株式会社) turnaround from bankruptcy

Bad news from Japan’s electronics industry sector makes global headlines this week (I was interviewed on BBC, US National Public Radio etc) – in this newsletter, lets look at some good news from Japan.

Kazuo Inamori (80 years old, born January 30, 1932), Japanese serial entrepreneur, founded Kyocera Corporation on April 1, 1959, founded DDI (now KDDI) in 1984, and turned around Japan Airlines (JAL) during the last two years.

Japan Airlines (JAL) went bankrupt on January 19, 2010, Kazuo Inamori turned around JAL, and JAL went public again on Tokyo Stock Exchange on September 19, 2012, returning substantial profit for the Enterprise Turnaround Initiative Corporation of Japan Fund.

Serial entrepreneur Kazuo Inamori
Serial entrepreneur Kazuo Inamori

Kazuo Inamori used his “Amoba Management” (アメーバ経営) techniques to rebuild Japan Airlines from bankruptcy

Kazuo Inamori is famous for “Amoeba Management (アメーバ経営)”, essentially Amoeba management means divisional accounting, and has been refined for the management of Kyocera and many other companies.

Today Kyocera is divided into about 3000 “amoebas” – applying the amoeba management methods to Japan Airlines

Applying “Amoeba management” to JAL, Kazuo Inamori installed a real time system, to determine the profit of each route and each single flight in real time, while in the past profits (or losses) at Japan Airlines, were calculated months after the fact.

Kazuo Inamori on leadership: “the leader must have a vision and burning determination to carry out the vision whatever the obstacles”, and must communicate aims and targets to everyone in the company.

On nuclear energy:

Japan’s energy / electricity sector is in upheaval, and given Japan’s respect for seniority, given Kazuo Inamori’s standing in Japan, understanding Kazuo Inamori’s opinion is very important for understanding how Japan’s energy landscape is likely to evolve in the future.

“In the past the problems of nuclear energy were hidden from the public, and in the future must be disclosed”.

“It is not possible to maintain the current sophisticated society without nuclear power”. He thinks that nuclear power is a necessary evil.

Copyright·©1997-2013 ·Eurotechnology Japan KK·All Rights Reserved·

Financial instability of Japan’s electricity companies started in 2007

Financial instability of Japan's electricity companies started in 2007 - long before the Fukushima nuclear accident

Financial instability of Japan’s electricity companies started long before the Fukushima nuclear accident

Japan’s electricity companies ran into financial instability long before the March 11, 2011 disaster

It is often assumed that the financial difficulties of Japan’s electricity companies are caused by the shut-down of almost all Japanese nuclear power stations within 13 months of the Fukushima disaster.

This newsletter shows that the financial impact of switching off Japan’s nuclear power stations does not seem to be the major contribution to the financial instability of Japan’s electricity companies.

However, this newsletter clearly proves that Japan’s electricity companies ran into financial instability long before the March 11, 2011 disaster and long before Japan’s nuclear power stations were switched off. The financial instability of Japan’s electricity companies seem to have started in 2004 – about 7 years before the Tohoku Earth-quake, as shown below. Therefore reform of Japan’s electricity industry sector is highly overdue.

Japan's electricity crisis predates the Fukushima disaster by several years
Japan’s electricity crisis predates the Fukushima disaster by several years

Financial instability of Japan’s electricity companies started with the increase of natural gas payments in 2004

Japan’s electricity industry sector is dominated by 10 regional electricity operators, which to a large extent have the monopolies of electricity business in their regions. In exchange, their profits are calculated as a fixed percentage of costs. However, the figure above shows, that this system had become unstable around 2009 following a strong increase of natural gas costs since 2004. The figure above clearly shows that the net profits of Japan’s 10 regional electricity operators started a steady decline since 2007, and dropped firmly into the red in the financial year FY 2010, which ended on March 31, 2011, ie almost entirely before the Fukushima disaster, and about a year before nuclear power stations were switched off in Japan.
This argument shows, that the difficulties of Japan’s electricity sector are even more profound than the cut-off of nuclear power stations, and shows that reform of Japan’s electricity sector is long overdue. For details read our report on Japan’s electrical industry sector.

Financial trouble of Japan's electricity companies started before Fukushima
Financial trouble of Japan’s electricity companies started before Fukushima

<

h2>Financial instability of Japan’s 10 electricity operators started in FY2007 – several years earlier than the Fukushima nuclear disaster

<

h2>
This figure shows the combined annual net income of Japan’s 10 regional electricity operators for the period FY1999 – FY2011. The figure clearly shows, that combined net after-tax income was extremely stable until 2007, when net income started to drop dramatically, and has been falling ever since, culminating in combined net losses of over US$ 20 billion in FY2011. Losses are expected to increase even further for FY2012.

This figure clearly shows, that the financial instability of Japan’s electricity companies started several years earlier than the March 11, 2011 disaster and well before any nuclear power stations were switched off. More details in our report on Japan’s electricity and energy sector.

Copyright·©2013 ·Eurotechnology Japan KK·All Rights Reserved·

Japanese electronics groups need new business models (BBC-interview: Yen ‘not the cause of woes of Japan’s electronics firms’)

Japanese electronics groups need new business models. BBC interview with Gerhard Fasol on Japanese electronics financial performance

Japanese electronics groups combined as of similar size as the economy of the Netherlands

Over the last 15 years combined annual sales growth was zero, and combined annual loss was US$ 0.6 billion/year

Japan’s “Big-8” electrical groups (Hitachi, Panasonic, Sony, Mitsubishi-Electric, Sharp, Toshiba, Fujitsu, NEC) combined are of similar economic size as the Netherlands.

Over the last 15 years, their combined annual sales growth was zero, and their combined annual loss was YEN 50.6 billion/year (= US$ 0.6 billion/year).

Compelling evidence that new business models for Japan’s electronics sector present a huge opportunity – as explained in this BBC interview.

Japanese electronics: Sales growth of Japan's
Sales growth of Japan’s “Big-8” electrical manufacturers vs top 7 electronics component makers

Contrasting Japan’s “Big-8” electronics groups (Hitachi, Panasonic, Sony, Mitsubishi-Electric, Sharp, Toshiba, Fujitsu, NEC) with Japan’s 7 electronic parts makers (Murata, Kyocera, TDK, Alps, Nidec, Nitto, ROHM)

Over the last 14 years since FY1997, the combined growth in revenues (=sales) of Japan’s “Big-8” electronics groups was zero.
The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of Japan’s top 7 electronic parts makers combined was +3.1%.

Japanese electronics: Net income/losses of Japan's
Net income/losses of Japan’s “Big-8” electronics giants vs top-7 electronics components makers

Net income (profit) of Japan’s “Big-8” electronics groups vs top-7 electronics parts makers

Over the last 14 years since FY1997, Japan’s “Big-8” electronics groups combined showed average losses of YEN 50.6 billion/year (=US$ 0.6 billion/year), while Japan’s top 7 electronic parts makers combined earned YEN 196 billion/year (= US$ 2.4 billion/year).

Japanese electronics: Net income/losses of Japan's top electrical groups
Net income/losses of Japan’s top electrical groups

Net after tax income of Japan’s “Big-8” electronics groups

This figure shows net after tax income for Japan’s “Big-8” electronics groups (Hitachi, Panasonic, Sony, Mitsubishi-Electric, Sharp, Toshiba, Fujitsu, NEC), for the years since FY1997. For 5 of these 14 years the industry sector reported combined losses, which in total exceeded the profits achieved in good years.
As a result, averaged over all 14 years, the industry sector shows combined losses on the order of US$ 0.6 billion/year.

Creating new business models for this very large industry sector (of similar economic size as the Netherlands) is a huge opportunity.

Japanese electronics: Net income/losses of Japan's top-7 electronic component makers
Net income/losses of Japan’s top-7 electronic component makers

Net income of Japan’s top 7 electronic parts makers

Japan’s top 7 electronic parts makers are in a much better financial situation than Japan’s electrical groups.

Over the last 14 years since FY1997, this industry sector only showed a net overall loss one single time – in the year following the Lehman shock, but showed combined net profits during all other years, resulting in average annual net profits on the order of US$ 2.4 billion/year.

BBC interview:
BBC interview: “New business models for Japan’s electrical groups needed”

BBC interview:
Watch an extract of the BBC interview about Japan’s electrical industry sector here: Yen ‘not the cause of woes of Japan’s electronics firms’.

More detailed data and analysis in our report on Japan’s electronics industry sector.

Japan electronics industries – mono zukuri. Preview this report:

Register and receive an email with a link to a free trial version of our report on “Japan electronics industries” and our newsletters.

Your Name (required)

Your Email (required)

Copyright·©2013 ·Eurotechnology Japan KK·All Rights Reserved·